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Abstract. This study provided an empirical test of the effects of compositional and process 
variables on board activism. The attributes examined were functional area knowledge, 
independence, duality, and effort norms. The findings from this study provided support for the 
positive relationships between both functional area knowledge and effort norms and board 
activism. The strong relationship between effort norms and activism indicates the importance 
of process variables in board research and the need for additional research using process 
variables in a board context giving further insight into board activism and governance. 
Additionally, the relationship between functional area knowledge and board activism 
highlights how boards ability to meet cognitive demands is critical in board performance. 
These results as well as future research directions are examined in the discussion.  
 




Management researchers have made significant contributions to board 
research incorporating both agency and resource dependence perspectives (e.g., Daily 
& Schwenk, 1996; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Rindova, 1999; Sonnenfeld, 2002). The 
premise behind agency theory is that there are two primary actors in every corporate 
activity, the principal and the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). Because the agent does not 
always act in alignment with the interests of the principal, the principal must monitor 
the behaviors of the agent. Agency theory thus indicates the need for board 
governance because of the self-interested nature of management. Another perspective 
prevalent in the board literature is resource dependence theory. According to resource 
dependence theory, organizations are dependent upon resources and these 
dependencies influence organizational decisions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Under 
this perspective, outside members provide access to valuable resources needed by the 
firm indicating the importance of board independence (e.g., Stearns & Mizruchi, 
1993). Both of these perspectives guided the development of various complex models 
of board governance, including constructs from the top management team (TMT) and 
group decision-making literatures and intermediate-stage causal links that mediate the 
relationship between directors’ characteristics and firm performance (e.g., Daily & 
Schwenk, 1996; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Rindova 1999; Sonnenfeld, 2002). Zahra 
and Pearce (1989) reviewed empirical research on board of directors and their effect 
on firm performance. The bulk of this research focused on relating factors such as 
board independence and duality to firm performance. Because their review produced Management & Marketing 
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mixed results, they suggested that efforts to link board attributes and firm performance 
were misguided and urged future research to review intermediate links between these 
attributes and firm performance. Despite recent additions since their review, little 
attention has been paid to empirically testing these intermediate links, such as the link 
between board attributes and board activism. Board activism is the extent to which a 
board of directors is involved in the affairs of the organization (Zahra and Pearce, 
1987); it is a measure of the scope of a board’s activities. These activities include 
attending meetings, reading board reports, evaluating the CEO, discussing succession 
planning, monitoring strategic direction, ensuring ethical and legal conduct, directing 
audit activities, reviewing financial and operating performance, approving capital and 
operating budgets, and approving mergers and acquisitions (Baker, 1945; Blair, 1950; 
Conger et al., 1998; Copeland and Towl, 1947; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Salmon, 
1993; Shultz, 2001).  
This study examines both compositional (e.g., functional area knowledge, 
independence, and duality) and process (e.g., effort norms) variables in relation to 
board activism. A considerable body of research has highlighted the impact of board 
composition and performance (e.g., Daily et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 1998). However, 
less attention has been directed towards process variables. Daily et al. (2003) indicated 
the need for additional research utilizing process variables. Research has found a 
positive relationship between effort norms and board performance (Wan and Ong, 
2005; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). However, the studies by Wan and Ong (2005) and 
Zona and Zattoni (2007) were implemented using Singapore and Italian firms 
respectively as their samples. Thus, this study adds to the literature by examining 
compositional and process variables leading to board activism in a U.S. sample. This 
study also responds to calls by Daily et al. (2003) for more multi-theoretical 
approaches in board research with our use of resource dependence theory, agency 
theory, cognition, and group norms in the development of the hypotheses.  
 
2. Background and hypotheses 
 
2.1. Functional area knowledge 
 
Early research has stressed the importance of directors’ abilities, judgments, 
knowledge, and experience to effective board governance (Baker, 1945; Bates, 1940; 
Blair, 1950; Copeland and Towl, 1947). A board’s performance depends inevitably on 
the capabilities of its members. The first step in creating an actively governed 
organization is to ensure that the board has the requisite expertise needed to govern 
effectively (Lorsch, 1995; Pound, 1995). A well balanced board is one that represents 
all the points of view needed by a particular corporation to foster sound management 
and governance. Because organizations have varying demands made on them as 
specified by resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), they are better 
equipped to react to these demands with a wider range of functional area knowledge 
than with a limited range. Also, organizations need board members with the Board composition, process, and activism: evidence within American firms 
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knowledge and skills that complement each other and are related to the mission of a 
particular organization (Salmon, 1993). Ideally, each board member satisfies more 
than one need for a particular knowledge area on the board (Conger et al., 1998) 
which, in turn, expands the scope and quality of strategic decisions (Ginsberg, 1994). 
Directors’ functional area knowledge is defined as the functional expertise of 
board members relevant to a firm’s operations and competitive position. Functional 
knowledge domains pertain to the traditional domains of business, including 
accounting, finance, and marketing (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). This definition of 
knowledge is consistent with the managerial cognitions literature that defines 
knowledge domains as categories of functional area expertise (Stubbart, 1989). 
Expertise includes knowledge about a certain domain, awareness of its main problems, 
and general approaches to solving the problems (Sullivan, 1990). Each area has its 
own sets of computational rules that are the operating mechanisms for encoding, 
locating, using, and changing mental representations determining what individuals 
deem to be important (Stubbart, 1989). Diverse members notice different stimuli and 
bring to a group’s attention different aspects of a complex reality (Rindova, 1999). 
Thus, boards with a wider range of functional area knowledge are comfortable with a 
broader range of issues and seek information about firm performance in these 
domains. This indicates that boards with a wide range of knowledge are able to meet 
the demands of the organization and are more involved in the affairs of the 
organization. Thus, a wide range of functional area knowledge amongst board 
members leads to more active board in its governance roles. This premise can be 
summarized in our first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Directors’ collective functional area knowledge has a positive 




An essential feature of an effective board is independence – members whose 
directorships constitute their only connection to the company (Shultz, 2001). 
Directors’ independence has been a construct of prime interest in the extant empirical 
research on corporate boards of directors (Johnson et al., 1996). From an agency 
perspective, independence means members are free from unresolved conflicts of 
interests and are autonomous vis-à-vis management (Lorsch, 1995). Effective decision 
control depends on whether directors are independent of executive management 
(Fama, 1980; Young et al., 2000). Therefore, having a proportion of outside members 
on the board helps to alleviate the extent to which there are conflicts of interests. 
When these scenarios arise, a board’s independence allows it to challenge 
management, thus promoting board activism. Additionally, the resource dependence 
perspective indicates the importance of board independence in activism. Resource 
dependence theorists view boards of directors as means to gain some level of control 
over critical resources in their external environment (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; 
Boeker and Goodstein, 1991; Pfeffer, 1972). Gaining control over critical resources is Management & Marketing 
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an aspect of board governance and thus, independence promotes this form of activism 
as well. So, both agency and resource dependence perspectives indicate the 
importance of independence in board activism. 
Furthermore, most empirical studies have used the proportion of outside 
directors on a board as a measure of directors’ independence and linked it to 
performance. However, this area has received mixed results. For instance, there have 
been studies where a higher proportion of inside directors had a positive effect on 
performance (e.g., Cochran et al., 1985). Conversely, others have found that a higher 
proportion of outside directors had a positive effect on performance (e.g., Rechner and 
Dalton, 1991). Some studies have even found no significance for the relationship of 
independence to performance (e.g., Kesner, 1987; Zahra and Stanton, 1988). Still, 
Pfeffer (1972) found the extent to which a board achieves an ideal ratio of outsiders to 
insiders had a positive effect on performance.  
Thus, we believe that boards of directors with conflicts of interests will not 
engage themselves broadly and exercise their legal authority if directors’ personal 
interests are at odds with their fiduciary duty to stockholders. Having an independent 
board would alleviate these conflicts of interests by making board activism more 
likely. Because effective decision control is dependent on the independence of the 
board of directors from executive management, a board with outside members makes 
it more likely that the board is looking out for the interests of the stockholders. In 
addition, the independence of the board would allow organizations greater access to 
information and other critical resources, which promote the activism of the board. 
Stated differently, board activism increases as the proportion of outside board 
members increases, which is the premise behind board independence. This brings us to 
our second hypothesis: 




Duality is defined as the situation where the board chair and CEO is the same 
person, and, thus, holds both positions in the organization. Board research has pointed 
to the dominant CEO as the single biggest threat to board activism (Bates, 1940; Berle 
and Means, 1932; Koontz, 1967; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Patton and Baker, 1987; 
Mace, 1971; Smith, 1958). When a CEO serves both as board chair and CEO, it 
creates a climate in which a CEO can dominate the board (Patton and Baker, 1987). 
Duality, therefore, is seen as a structural condition that increases the ability of CEOs 
to dominate their boards and thereby hinder board activism. Consistent with agency 
theory, the concern is unitary leadership stifles board activism because many CEOs 
prefer passive boards that acquiesce to their leadership. Therefore, duality decreases 
board activism because directors are not free to probe, question, and debate corporate 
issues and, therefore, less likely to initiate action (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Thus, our 
third hypothesis tests this premise. 
Hypothesis 3: Duality has a negative effect on board activism. Board composition, process, and activism: evidence within American firms 
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2.4. Effort norms 
 
Effort norms are directors’ shared beliefs about the level of effort directors 
should expend on board work (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). A key element in creating 
an effective board is that directors should be required to devote a substantial portion of 
their professional time to the corporation (Pound, 1995). Directors must be able and 
willing to devote the necessary effort to the job to fulfill their responsibilities to 
stockholders, creditors, employees, and other stakeholders (Copeland and Towl, 
1947). Pound (1995) argues that boards should commit to a minimum of 25 days in 
order to fulfill these responsibilities. Additionally, strong effort norms enhance the 
effort each director exerts as a member (Feldman, 1984; Steiner, 1972; Wageman, 
1995). Conclusively, strong effort norms mean all directors are expected either to 
invest the personal resources necessary to become informed and active board members 
or to resign their positions from the board. Boards whose directors devote the requisite 
personal resources to their board duties seek out the information they need to apply 
their functional area knowledge to a broad range of issues relevant to a firm’s success 
(Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). This brings us to our fourth hypothesis. 




3.1. Sample and procedures 
 
We tested the hypotheses by surveying corporate secretaries who are members 
of the American Society of Corporate Secretaries (ASCS). Corporate secretaries were 
surveyed because they attend all board meetings and have extensive knowledge of the 
activities of the board of directors. Prior to administering the survey, it was reviewed 
by two faculty members active in corporate governance and pre-tested on a sample of 
ten corporate secretaries. Following a favorable review, the survey was emailed to 
1,600 corporate secretaries from the ASCS database. The sample of 1,600 was 
obtained from secretaries listed on the ASCS database who worked for public 
organizations. Of those emailed, 135 secretaries completed the survey for a response 




3.2.1. Board activism  
 
The survey included a 23-item measure of board activism. Respondents used a 
five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1, „a low rating”, „to 5, „a high rating”, 
which reported the degree that the secretary agreed that the board was active in 
activities such as „Attend board meetings”, „Direct internal audit activities”, and 
„Regulatory compliance”. Management & Marketing 
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3.2.2. Functional area knowledge 
 
  Forbes and Milliken (1999) suggested a Likert-type scale be used to measure 
the extent to which functional area knowledge are present on a board. The survey 
included a 23-item measure using a Likert-type scale ranging from 1, „a low rating”, 
to 5, „a high rating”, which reported the degree that the secretary believed the 
expertise was present on the board of directors and the importance of the expertise to 
the firm’s success. The items of functional area knowledge included expertise such as 
„Accounting”, „Corporate governance”, „Finance”, and „Labor relations”. Also, 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) suggested respondents rate the importance of individual 
domains so researchers can use an additive measure that weights important domains 
more heavily than less important domains. Thus, directors’ functional area knowledge 
was weighted based on the indicated importance of the directors’ functional expertise. 




Most empirical studies have used the proportion of outside directors on a 
board as a measure of directors’ independence (Daily and Dalton 1995). Johnson et al. 
(1996) suggested director independence be measured using the SEC guidelines for 
determining director independence. The data source for this measure was archival data 




The survey simply asked the secretaries if the CEO also serves as the board 
chair. Then, dummy codes were created where 1 was „Yes” and 0 was „No.” 
 
3.2.5. Effort norms 
 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) suggested effort norms be operationalized using 
Wageman’s (1995) example by asking board members to rate the board’s expectations 
and support for certain behaviors of all board members. The survey consisted of a 6-item 
measure ranging from 1, „a low rating”, to 5, „a high rating”, which reported the extent 
that the secretary perceived the board’s expectations and support with statements such as 
„carefully scrutinizing the information provided by the firm prior to the meetings”,     
„researching issues relevant to the company”, „taking notes during the meetings”, and 
„participating actively during meetings”. The directors’ effort norms were treated as an 
additive measure of the board’s expectations regarding the level of effort of the board as 




Industry, diversification, and firm size, were measured using archival data 
extracted from Compustat and used as control variables. A firm’s industry code was 
included in the data analysis as a control variable to account for variance in board Board composition, process, and activism: evidence within American firms 
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activity that might be associated with firms in heavily regulated industries. For 
example, boards of directors of firms in the banking industry might engage themselves 
in a wider scope of board activities just to satisfy banking rules and regulations. The 
data source for this measure was the firm’s SIC code – if the firm was in a highly 
regulated industry (e.g., the banking industry), then the variable was coded „1”. 
Otherwise, the variable was coded „0”. 
Whether a firm was diversified in its business operations was included in the 
data analysis as a control variable to account for the variance in board activity that 
might be associated with firms with highly diverse business operations. Boards of 
directors of firms with diversified operations might engage themselves in a wider 
scope of board activities just to keep track of business operations. The data source for 
this measure was a firm’s long business description in the Compustat database. If the 
long business description indicated a firm had highly diversified business operations 
(e.g., more than one unrelated product with sizable revenues), the variable was coded 
„1”. Otherwise, the variable was coded „0”. 
Firm size was included in the data analysis as a control variable to account for 
the variance in board activity that might be associated with firms with large business 
volumes. For example, boards of directors of large firms might engage themselves in a 
wider scope of board activities just to comprehend the complexity of a large business 
operation with thousands of employees or multiple operating locations. The data 




Table 1 includes means, standard deviations, and correlations of our measures. 
Although some of the variables are correlated, none of the variance inflation factor 
statistics estimated with our model exceeded 1.73, which is well below 10, the value 
where multicollinearity is a concern. 
Table 1 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations 
Variables  Mean  s.d.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Board activism  85.57  15.95  ---               
2. Functional area 
knowledge 
233.85 79.44  .46** ---             
3. Independence .43  .25  -.06  .12  ---        
4. Effort norms  22.09  5.77  .56** .47** .02 (.90)         
5. Duality .30  .46  -.07  -.10  .01  -.04  ---       
6. Industry .58  5.16  .12  .13  -.02  .06  -.05  ---     
7. Diversification  .03  .17  -.04 .01 -.02 .00 -.02 -.01  ---   
8. Firm size  5574.86  22786.92  .12  .26** .09 .24** -.10 -.02 -.02 --- 
Note. n = 135; s.d. = standard deviation; Cronbach’s alphas appear on the diagonal in parentheses. 
** p<.01 
 Management & Marketing 
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We tested our hypotheses using a multiple regression model. The results of 
the F test of overall model fit indicate the model is significant. The results of the 
t-tests for each partial regression coefficients indicate that there are two significant 
independent variables, functional area knowledge and effort norms. Independence and 
duality were not statistically significant, and none of the control variables were 
statistically significant. The signs of the partial regression coefficients were positive 
for both significant variables. Refer to Table 2 for the Regression analysis. Thus, the 
regression showed support for both H1 and H4 but not for H2 and H3. While 
functional area knowledge and effort norms were both positively related to board 
activism, no relationship was found between independence and board activism or 
duality and board activism. 
 
Table 2 
Results of regression analysis 
 
Independent variables  Board Activism 
Functional area knowledge  .53* 
Independence -5.83 




Firm size  .00 
R2  .38 
F  11.27* 





Our research contributes to the management literature in several ways. First, 
prior empirical research has failed to find a consistent and practically significant 
relationship between board attributes and firm performance; this study opens the 
„black box” between board attributes and firm performance and empirically tests the 
antecedents of board activism, an intermediate link to effective board governance and 
firm performance. Prior empirical research has focused primarily on the effect of 
directors’ independence and duality on firm performance; results have been 
inconsistent and contradictory. Zahra and Pearce (1989) concluded the search for a 
direct link between board attributes was misguided and would continue to yield 
contradictory findings. They urged future researchers to study the intermediate links 
between board attributes and firm performance. This study tested an intermediate link 
and the results were fruitful additions to the literature.  
Second, we found empirical support for the positive relationship between 
functional area knowledge and board activism which is consistent with current Board composition, process, and activism: evidence within American firms 
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findings (Zona and Zattoni, 2007). For many years, it has been persistently argued that 
strong boards are well-balanced boards in terms of varied backgrounds, experiences, 
and perspectives of directors (Blair, 1950; Copeland and Towl, 1947; Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999; Koontz, 1967; Norburn, 1986; Salmon, 1993). More recently, Rindova 
(1999) speculated directors’ expertise is a more prevalent issue than corporate 
governance research has previously recognized. This study points towards Rindova’s 
contention – director’s expertise has a significant effect on board activism, a finding 
that focuses greater attention on the importance of directors’ cognitions. This finding 
also suggests boards of directors should be viewed as intellectual assets of a 
corporation. The question corporate stakeholders must ask is whether this asset, like 
other corporate assets, is providing an appropriate return on investment or is it among 
the list of corporate assets that are underperforming. Boards of directors are 
potentially valuable assets because both outside and inside directors bring a variety of 
experiences, judgments, and functional area knowledge that are potentially applicable 
to the cognitive needs of the corporation. Complexity and uncertainty are staples of 
most organizations’ operating environment. To cope with complexity and uncertainty, 
directors develop perceptual filters and dominant logics (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) 
that correspond to their experiences as leaders of their own organizations and as 
directors of other organizations. A board of directors, however, is comprised of 
directors who bring multiple perceptual filters and dominant logics to the governance 
of a corporation. It is the diversity of these perspectives and the degree to which they 
match the cognitive demands of a particular corporation that increase board activism. 
Together, directors scan larger volumes of environmental and organizational data and 
view the data through multiple perspectives and logic. Directors’ varied knowledge 
domains thereby reduce the risk of competitive blind spots (Zajac and Bazerman, 
1991). Directors categorize information they receive and create links to preexisting 
knowledge areas and beliefs, and use these links to conceive actions and 
consequences. Directors with diverse functional area knowledge increase the overall 
cognitive capacity of a board. Thus, functional area knowledge is critical to both the 
scope and the ultimate quality of directors’ decision-making. When cognitive capacity 
matches the cognitive demands of a corporation’s business environment, board 
activism increases. In other words, as cognitive diversity is applied to the cognitive 
needs of a corporation’s competitive environment, a board’s involvement in the affairs 
of a corporation increases.  
Third, this study indicates a strong link between effort norms and board 
activism. This finding reinforces Sonnenfeld’s (2002) argument that the key to active 
and effective boards is to view boards as social systems, not structural elements. In 
fact, he argues some of the most effective boards of directors do not follow all 
structural rules-of-thumb. Instead, truly high-performing boards of directors are ones 
that act as robust, effective social systems. Effort norms are a fundamental element of 
a board’s social system – they are shared beliefs about the level of effort directors 
should expend on board work. These shared beliefs create the environment in which 
directors summon the motivation to become active board members. Norms have been Management & Marketing 
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shown to exert a strong influence on group behavior (Feldman, 1984; Latane et al., 
1979; Steiner, 1972; Weldon and Gargano, 1985). A key element in creating an 
effective board of directors is the devotion of sufficient time, effort, and resources to 
the corporation (Pound, 1995). Strong effort norms directly and indirectly 
communicate to all directors what they are expected to invest personally to become 
informed and active board members. 
Fourth, from a methodological standpoint, this is the first time that corporate 
secretaries have been used as key informants in board research. Currently, this is a tough 
environment in which to do board research, especially survey research. Corporate 
directors are fearful of shareholder lawsuits, and understandably, they do not want to 
create a discoverable document that can be used against their company in the event of a 
shareholder lawsuit. Corporate secretaries are arguably the most knowledgeable and 
objective sources of information about board activities because they generally attend all 
board and committee meetings, coordinate director search and evaluation processes, 
supervise the preparation and distribution of board materials, and communicate with 
directors regularly to plan schedules and answer questions that may arise. In many cases, 
corporate secretaries are attorneys; they are highly educated and understand director 
responsibilities and legal liability. Corporate secretaries should be regarded as a more 
accessible and objective source of data for board research. 
Finally, the absence of support for independence and duality warrants some 
discussion. Directors’ independence was not found to have a link with board activism, 
at least as operationalized and tested in this study. Independence as a construct of true 
theoretical significance is a director’s ability to block-out self-interest and make 
decisions only in the best interests of shareholders and other stakeholders to whom a 
director has a fiduciary responsibility. Efforts to operationalize this construct, 
however, as the proportion of outside directors or the proportion of independent 
directors as defined by SEC guidelines may fail to tap its true theoretical significance. 
On the other hand, it could be directors’ independence is simply not related to board 
activism. It may only relate to the quality of a board’s decisions, which was outside 
the scope of this study. It could be the preponderance of boards is, in fact, truly 
independent, and the variance is too small to relate the variance in board activities. 
Still, the lack of support for this construct calls into question the validity of 
independence as an antecedent of board activism. Of course, meta-analytic results 
have indicated no relationship of board independence with firm performance (Dalton 
et al. 2003). The results found here may extend our knowledge of why independence 
is not typically found to relate to firm performance. It may be that board independence 
does not by itself initiate board activism; thus, it would not relate to firm performance. 
Duality also does not appear to have an effect on board activism. Duality has 
been the most studied structural element in board research. Like other studies of board 
attributes, the results of empirical studies of duality have yielded mixed results. 
Rechner and Dalton (1991) found duality was positively related to firm performance. 
Whereas, Chaganti et al., (1985) found duality was not related to firm performance as 
measured by firm bankruptcy. Berg and Smith (1978) found duality had a positive Board composition, process, and activism: evidence within American firms 
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effect on only one of four measures of firm performance. The results of this study add 
to a growing list of contradictory findings. Duality is less important when outside 
directors collectively decide to exercise board authority, regardless of who occupies 
the board chair position. In the current corporate environment, duality may be less 
important because current SEC guidelines police passive governance policies. 
Therefore, when environmental conditions override a CEO’s ability to dictate board 
activities, duality as a predictor variable diminishes in importance. A related construct 
of greater theoretical significance is an open and constructive board culture that is 
conducive to free and vibrant discussions of issues pertinent to the long-term success 
of a corporation. Such an environment is conducive to cognitive conflict, which has 
been linked to decision quality. Jehn (1995) defines cognitive conflict as 
disagreements about the content concerning the tasks being performed. It involves the 
use of processes involving critical and investigative interaction (Amason, 1996). 
Critical investigation has the potential of discovering flawed assumptions in 
management’s plans. Cognitive conflict has been found to increase the number of 
alternative and creative solutions considered by small groups (Eisenhardt et al., 1997; 
Jackson, 1992; Milliken and Vollrath, 1991). Board culture has the potential to 
influence decision quality by promoting cognitive conflict in the boardroom. Thus, 
duality as a structural construct of continuing significance in board research is suspect. 
It may be time to advance a more sophisticated view of factors that impact a board’s 
decision scope and quality, such as board culture and cognitive conflict. 
 
5.1. Limitations of the study 
 
The findings of this study should be viewed in light of its limitations. One 
limitation of this study is it is cross-sectional, so it does not establish temporal 
precedence for inferring causation. Despite this fact, the strength of the proposed 
theory and the incorporation of control variables aid the reader in making their own 
judgments as to whether empirically supported associations sustain causal inferences. 
A second limitation of this study is findings are generalizable only to publicly 
traded companies because the sample was limited to companies listed on the NYSE, 
the NASDAQ, and the American Stock Exchange. Furthermore, the sample was 
limited to publicly traded U.S. companies whose corporate secretaries were members 
of the American Society of Corporate Secretaries. This may imply results are 
generalizable only to US public companies with more sophisticated commitments to 
board governance, as evidenced by their commitment to membership in an 
organization dedicated to improving board governance. 
A final limitation is common source bias. The use of corporate secretaries as 
the only source of data may have inflated the results found here. Future research 
should attempt to overcome this limitation and the others discussed here by 




5.2. Areas for future research 
 
This study points to a new direction in the management research with the 
findings of the relationships of board activism with both functional area knowledge and 
effort norms. Future board researchers should build upon this study’s findings on 
directors’ functional area knowledge and plunge deeper into the realms of managerial 
cognitions as it applies to boards of directors. They should explore antecedents of board 
decision quality including functional area knowledge, cognitive conflict, and 
information quality. The relationships between board culture, directors’ cohesion, and 
cognitive conflict should also be explored. Much of the normative literature points to the 
importance of board activities that build group cohesion as being vitally important to 
healthy board relationships. Board trips to visit plant sites and board dinners prior to 
meetings are seen by directors as building group cohesion, which in turn, sustains 
cognitive conflict and positively influences decision quality. A related question, 
however, is do such activities impair independence? Without group cohesion, cognitive 
conflict can slip into the realm of affective conflict with all its dysfunctional 
consequences. 
Information quality is one construct that has received surprisingly little attention 
in the literature on boards of directors. As directors spend both limited and intermittent 
time preparing for board meetings, the quality of information provided to board 
members should have a significant impact on decision quality. What are the attributes of 
quality information provided to board members? Are there individual differences that 
affect information quality and decision outcomes? What types of information are most 
important in a board’s decision making process? Does it matter whether board 
information is externally or internally focused, operational, or financial in nature, risk-
based, or market-based, forward or backward looking, textual or visual, etc? How timely 
is timely as it relates to making board decisions? How much information is too much? 
These research questions are rich opportunities for future board research. 
Likewise, future board researchers should build on this study’s findings 
regarding directors’ effort norms and explore the salient antecedents of directors’ 
motivation. Does higher board compensation attract and retain more highly motivated 
board members? Do director stock options motivate board members to dedicate more 
time to board service? Are retired executives more motivated than current executives? 
What are the antecedents to strong board effort norms? Besides effort norms, are there 
other elements of board culture that are essential? Each of these research questions is 
an opportunity to explore and push the bounds of current board research. 
 
5.3. Practical implications 
 
In reviewing the practical implications for this study, we focused on effort 
norms, which provided the strongest behavioral link to board activism. From a 
practical standpoint, boards of directors must think in terms of what they can do to Board composition, process, and activism: evidence within American firms 
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establish and maintain appropriate effort norms. Director recruitment is an ideal 
opportunity to communicate expectations and performance standards that reinforce 
effort norms or push them to higher levels. Directors should be able to sense the level 
of commitment and due diligence that is expected of them before they accept a 
position on a board of directors. Likewise, existing directors should get a sense of 
whether a director nominee is likely to schedule the time necessary to become an 
informed and active board member before committing to a director nominee. 
New director orientation is another opportunity to reinforce or enhance 
existing effort norms. At these orientation sessions, issues such as definitions of 
conflicts of interests, and the manner in which potential conflicts are disclosed are 
important topics. Further, reviewing the standard board book and highlighting key 
operational and financial drivers are important topics at new director orientation 
sessions. An active board member evaluation process can also serve to reinforce or 
strengthen effort norms. An evaluation system provides constructive feedback about 
whether a director’s level of effort and contribution to board governance is acceptable, 
or it can serve as the basis for a decision not to reelect a director. In short, there are 
several ways boards can establish or enhance effort norms, and this study finds that 




Because board governance is such an important part of organizational 
performance, the need for a better understanding of intermediate links to performance, 
such as board attributes and board activism, continues to grow. This study provides an 
important contribution to board research by highlighting the importance of two 
attributes, functional area knowledge and effort norms, as positive antecedents of 
board activism. Finally, this study should serve as a foundation for future research 
concerning these intermediate links and encourage other researchers to explore other 
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